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On June 12, 2026, SpaceX comes to public markets at $135 a share, a valuation near $1.75 trillion and about 107 times sales, among the most expensive equities ever brought to investors. Some of that price is artificial intelligence. Goldman Sachs, the lead underwriter, projects $322 billion of AI revenue in 2030 inside a $474 billion consolidated total, and it published that single segment line with nothing beneath it. The question worth asking before the roadshow talking points harden is not whether to trust the number. It is what the number is built from, and how much of it rides on Grok, the model Elon Musk names most often.

Break the aggregate into its parts and most of it has little to do with how good Grok is.

Start with the one piece that carries a documented price today: compute, which SpaceX earns as a landlord rather than as a model-maker. SpaceX rents capacity on Colossus 1, its original Memphis cluster, to rival labs. Anthropic pays about $1.25 billion a month under terms scoped through May 2029, and Google about $920 million a month from October 2026 through June 2029, each running its own models on SpaceX hardware. Those two contracts alone run near $26 billion a year, and not one dollar of it depends on Grok’s quality. The tenant’s model does the work, and SpaceX collects the rent.

Goldman broke out nothing below its total, so the rest has to be reconstructed from the disclosed contracts and published pricing. Built from the bottom up, the 2030 projection sorts into four blocks. Operational AI, the compute leasing plus the autonomy embedded in vehicles and the network, comes to roughly $92 billion, about 29% of the projection, and depends on Grok not at all. Grok itself, the language-and-reasoning model, comes to roughly $45 billion, about 14%. X-platform advertising adds roughly $12 billion, about 4%. The largest block by far, roughly $173 billion or about 54%, is a pure residual: the gap between what can be built from documented sources and Goldman’s much larger aggregate. Recon Analytics reads that residual as further compute and infrastructure growth, but nothing that we can see documents it, so the conclusion that compute and operational AI dominate the projection holds only if that reading is right. All four sizes are Recon Analytics estimates. Goldman published none of them.

That leaves Grok carrying about a seventh of the projection, roughly $45 billion by 2030, against revenue well under $2 billion in 2025, inside an AI segment the S-1 reports at $3.2 billion that year. The climb the projection assumes, from under $2 billion to $45 billion in four years, is the part of the SpaceX AI story that actually turns on Grok. At about 107 times sales, every dollar of projected revenue carries a steep premium, and the 14% exposed to Grok carries it like the rest.

That climb is not a given, and the people closest to Grok are the reason. Among AI users who name a primary tool, only 1.7% name Grok, and that base is the most male-skewed of any major assistant at 77.2% against 54.2% for the field. They adopt AI at work less than the field does and bring Grok to work least of any major tool, they are the least willing to pay more, naming $6.50 a month to upgrade against $11.70 for Claude’s users, and they name bias a concern most often, at 23.0% against 13.5% for the field. A revenue line built to reach $45 billion has to convert a base that is, for now, the hardest of the majors to convert. The counterweight sits in the same data. Grok’s accuracy rating climbed from clearly negative into positive territory in April and May 2026, and the users who already pay report good value for the money. That is early, directional evidence that the rebuild Musk describes may be reaching the product, even as the trust and bias gaps have not moved.

So the disaggregation points an investor toward a cleaner way to price the AI line. Pay for what Grok does today, which is real but modest: bounded jobs across X, Tesla, Starlink support, and SpaceX’s own engineering, none of them in a loop where a wrong answer costs a life or a mission. Then treat the run to $45 billion as an option on a rebuild that Musk says is underway, priced as a probability rather than a promise. Most of the $322 billion is landlord compute and operational autonomy that will earn or fail to earn on their own merits no matter what happens to Grok.

One sensitivity sits above the others, and it cuts the other way. The Anthropic and Google leases carry 90-day cancellation clauses, and Musk has described the Anthropic arrangement in public as limited to six months, which sits in tension with the headline term running to 2029. If those leases shorten, the operational base that anchors this whole reconstruction shrinks with them. That is the single largest swing in the picture, and it works against the compute revenue, not against Grok.

What to watch from here is narrow. During and after the roadshow, listen for what SpaceX and Musk claim about Grok’s role inside that AI number, because the gap between Grok’s small current revenue and the large role the selling story implies for it is the whole tension. Watch whether the compute leases hold their headline terms or shrink toward Musk’s six-month characterization. And watch whether the rebuild produces a materially better model rather than a better name. Price the parts, not the headline, and most of SpaceX’s AI number sits clear of Grok.

Source: Recon Analytics AI Pulse, US named-primary AI users, March through May 2026 (Grok n=744; field n=44,541).

The simple story about wireless is a price war: multi-year price locks, free lines, cable carriers underselling the mobile network operators and fixed wireless exceeding everyone’s expectations. A more complex story is revealed by the MNOs detailed earnings results. The core price of connectivity has been flat for nearly four years while household income has increased. Net net? The carriers turned themselves into discount storefronts for the services they sell.

Reported wireless revenue per line looks like it climbed. Blended across AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon, postpaid phone ARPU rose from $53.22 in the second half of 2022 to $56.37 in early 2026, a roughly 6% rise. But Verizon, the carrier driving most of the 6% increase books streaming and cloud perks inside its reported ARPU. Its former consumer chief revenue officer stated publicly in March 2025 that 15% of wireless service revenue now comes from non-connectivity services, a figure that was zero when myPlan launched in May 2023 and is closer to 17% today. Strip the perks out on the same ramp, and the picture inverts. Blended core connectivity ARPU went from $53.22 to $52.76, flat to slightly down in nominal dollars across three and a half years.

Meanwhile, nominal disposable income per household climbed about 19% in the last four years according to the US government’s Bureau of Economic Analysis. Flat price, rising income, and the math is easy to understand.

Wireless is carrier-reported core ARPU (Verizon perk-adjusted). BEA NIPA per-capita nominal disposable personal income (series A229RC), scaled to household; real-terms adjustment uses the BEA DPI deflator (A229RC/A229RX); October 2025 onward extrapolated

Wireless fell from 1.09% of household disposable income to 0.91%, a 17% reduction in the relative burden, while the core price per line did not rise at all. That is the paradox in one line: ARPU went up, the price of connectivity did not, and telecom claimed less of the wallet driving real world savings for American families.

In real terms the gap is starker. Over the period the disposable-income price level rose about 9%, so a household’s real purchasing power grew roughly 9% rather than the full 19% nominal, while the core price of wireless, flat in nominal dollars, fell about 10% after inflation. The device is the one place inflation barely matters: the climb in smartphone selling prices is mostly premiumization, real buyers choosing more expensive phones, not the dollar losing value, with carriers footing for most Americans. Inflation-adjusted, connectivity got cheaper, incomes got larger, and only the hardware the consumer chose to upgrade got pricier.

While prices remained steady in the last several years, the value consumers are taking from their wireless providers has dramatically increased. Let’s look at Verizon by way of example.

Verizon is the lone nationwide carrier that books its perks into reported service revenue, about $10.50 per line by 2026, which is why Verizon alone takes the perk adjustment in the numbers above. The perks represent significant savings: Netflix and Max for $10 against roughly $18 bought separately, Apple One and Google One at about half of their near-$20 retail.

T-Mobile and AT&T deliver streaming without increasing their ARPU at all. T-Mobile folds Netflix into the plan and gives it away, and the Apple TV+ that shows up at $3 on a T-Mobile bill is passed straight through to Apple, not booked as T-Mobile service revenue. So two of the three nationwide carriers were already at clean core connectivity pricing, and only Verizon’s apparent climb was perks. The industry turned itself into a half-price, often free, storefront for streaming and cloud while holding the price of the pipe flat.

The value consumers are getting on the device side has increased as well. Consider the following. Recon Analytics Device Intelligence shows the sellout-weighted average selling price of a US smartphone reached $738 across 2025 and peaked at $868 in the fourth quarter, the iPhone 17 launch window, up from roughly $615 a year earlier. Forty percent of phones sold in 2025 cost $800 or more, and nearly one in five was a $999-and-up flagship. The market has finished its move to 5G: 93% of phones bought in 2025 were 5G-capable, so the network the carriers spent years building now sits in nearly every new device. Apple accounts for 57% of US units sold at an $884 average, Google’s Pixel tops the range at $992, Samsung holds a quarter of the market at $652, and Motorola anchors the value end at $285. consumers have access to better devices while the carrier absorbs the cost.

Nearly one in five phones sold still costs under $300, so the household that wants to spend less can, while carrier trade-in credits and multi-year interest-free financing put the $884 Apple within monthly reach for the household that wants the best.

For the American consumer, all of this adds up to one of the best deals in the household budget.

Wireless service runs about $130 a month for a typical multi-line household and has been flat in nominal terms since 2022, under 1% of disposable income and falling about 10% in real terms. For that, plus a device financed at zero interest with carrier generally crediting back the financing cost, the household carries a premium 5G phone whose $700-plus sticker it never felt, multi-year price certainty, and a stack of streaming and cloud services worth $25 to $45 a month at retail for a fraction of that or nothing. A family that would pay $40 to $50 assembling Netflix, a second streamer, and cloud storage on the open market gets the same through the carrier for $10 to $20, or free on T-Mobile. Connectivity is cheaper as a share of income than at almost any point in the smartphone age, the rising cost of the device is absorbed by the carrier, and the services that ride the network arrive at half price or no price.

The competitive read inverts the conventional wisdom. This was not a race to the bottom on price. Carriers held core connectivity prices flat for four years and grew revenue by selling discounted services the customer wanted, while the affordability cushion underneath quietly widened. Wireless now sits below 1% of household disposable income. At that level, a price increase is closer to noise in the family budget than the switching trigger it was when wireless approached 1.4%. The pricing power is real and underused, and the next dollar of revenue is far more likely to come from perks, premium tiers, and device economics than from the base plan. The strategic question is no longer how low the bill must go. It is how much value carriers can stack on a bill that already claims less of the paycheck than at almost any point in the smartphone age.

May 2026

Satellite internet used to mean one thing in the business world: a slow, expensive connection of last resort when nothing else was available. HughesNet and Viasat filled that role for years, and nobody was excited about it. LEO satellite operators, including Starlink, have changed that story. Lower latency, faster speeds, and a product that can actually compete with fixed wireless have moved satellite from the back of the options list to a legitimate part of businesses’ connectivity fabric. However, even with greater acceptance of LEO satellite communications, Starlink still has a limited market position.

The Coverage Gap Story

The strongest direct sales case for Starlink in business markets is the coverage gap. Go where the competition does not. It sounds simple, and in a lot of ways it is.

Between March 4 and April 7, 2026, we asked businesses whether they would work with a smaller ISP if that ISP could deliver Starlink connectivity in places where they currently had no coverage (Large n=586, Midsize n=455, Small n=554). Large businesses came in at 72%, midsize at 62%, and small businesses at 44%. The 28-point spread between large and small is the part worth paying attention to. Large businesses are most receptive because they are most likely to already be living with this problem. A company with 50 locations almost certainly has some of those locations sitting outside fiber and cable reach. A small business with one rural location either has the problem or it does not. For the large enterprise managing a dispersed footprint, a Starlink-augmented ISP solves something concrete and immediate.

Figure 1. Percent of Respondents Who Would Work with a Smaller ISP if They Augmented Coverage with Starlink

Source: Recon Analytics 3/4/2026-4/7/2026, Large n = 586, Midsize n = 455, Small n = 554

The second piece of data that helps to illustrate the coverage gap opportunity for Starlink comes from a different question. Between November 5, 2025, and May 6, 2026, we surveyed 9,913 businesses and found 1,483 that were unhappy with their current internet provider but had not switched. Among small businesses in that group, 27% said the reason they had not left was simple: there were no other options. For midsize businesses it was 11%, and for large businesses just 6%.

That 27% small-business figure is where Starlink’s direct-sales pitch is at its strongest. When a business is stuck with a provider they dislike because there is literally nothing else, Starlink is not going head to head with a well-resourced competitor. It is filling a gap that nobody else is filling. That is a very different conversation.

Figure 2. Limited Alternative Internet Provider as Reason to Stay with Current Provider

Source: Recon Analytics 11/5/2025-5/6/2026, Large n = 361, Midsize n = 502, Small n = 620

Moving outside of areas with little to no broadband access will be more difficult for Starlink as larger businesses do not just buy connectivity from their ISPs. Larger businesses buy a full suite of solutions including security, direct cloud connectivity, and SD-WAN. These are all services that Starlink does not provide. Starlink, currently, just provides connectivity.

The FWA Backup Case

The satellite-as-backup to primary internet access is Starlink’s other major business connectivity opportunity. Starlink does not need to win the primary internet relationship here. It just needs to be there when the primary connection goes down.

AT&T and Verizon already do something similar with FWA. Both service providers use their FWA network as a failover solution incase the primary internet access line they provide should have an outage. Satellite can provide the same function in areas where FWA is not available or where FWA is the primary access technology.

Recon Analytics tested this concept directly with U.S. businesses during the first half of 2026. Between April 1 and April 29, 2026, we asked businesses whether satellite backup would make FWA a more attractive primary connection (Large n=525, Midsize n=464, Small n=563). Large and midsize businesses both came in at 34%. Small businesses were at 24%. These numbers predate T-Mobile’s SuperBroadband announcement in May 2026, which matters. Starlink failover is one of key features of SuperBroadband. This is demand that existed before the product launched, not demand manufactured by a marketing push.

The practical reality, though, is that the FWA backup opportunity mostly runs through carriers, not through Starlink’s direct sales team. T-Mobile owns the customer relationship in SuperBroadband. Comcast Business owns it in its managed connectivity offering which utilizes Starlink as well. That is a lower-margin model than selling direct, and it means accepting a role as infrastructure provider rather than service provider. The upside is scale. Carrier channels can reach enterprise accounts and multi-location businesses that Starlink cannot do as efficiently on its own.

The longer-term question for Starlink is whether it stays in that infrastructure role or eventually moves to compete directly in markets where carrier partners currently hold the customer. Nothing in Starlink’s commercial agreements with T-Mobile or Comcast prevents it from doing so. The constraint right now is product fit, not contract language. That distinction is worth keeping in mind when thinking about how durable these partnerships really are. The recently announced joint venture between AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon on direct-to-device satellite communications could complicate Starlink’s relationship with T-Mobile and be a catalyst for Starlink to take a more aggressive role in selling directly to businesses.

Apple gained 6.3 points in installed-base share among 18-to-29-year-old US smartphone users from Q3 2025 to Q1 2026. Exclusive loyalty in the same cohort is 12.3 percent, 23 points below the 60-plus reading.

In the US smartphone installed base, Apple commands the 18-to-29 cohort at 73.7 percent share across the combined Q3 2025 to Q1 2026 window, more than three times Samsung’s combined 19.5 percent. Behind that combined reading, the trend is also moving in Apple’s favor. Apple’s 18-to-29 share rose from 68.9 percent in Q3 2025 to 75.2 percent in Q1 2026, a 6.3-point gain in nine months that is well above the margin of error.

The data come from Recon Analytics’ Consumer Pulse Survey, covering 248,279 US smartphone respondents tracked from Q3 2025 through Q1 2026, with respondents’ device brand and model identified via passive detection at survey entry rather than self-report. Apple’s installed base is 93.2 percent in the premium tier and 6.8 percent in the value tier. Samsung’s installed base splits roughly 50-50 between Samsung Flagship and Samsung Non-Flagship.

The age-cohort gap closes sharply by 45-plus and then reverses. Samsung’s combined book reaches 44.7 percent of the 45-to-60 cohort and 44.1 percent of the 60-plus cohort, its highest installed-base concentrations across the four cohorts tracked. Apple’s combined share in those same cohorts falls to 40.2 percent and 42.6 percent. At the brand-total level, Samsung’s installed base exceeds Apple’s at 45-plus, an inversion of the 18-to-29 reading.

Chart 1: US Smartphone Installed-Base Share by Age Cohort

Inside the comparable premium tier, the gap compresses even more sharply than the brand-level numbers indicate. Apple Flagship leads Samsung Flagship across all age cohorts. In the 18-to-29 cohort, Apple’s flagship installed-base share is 69.8 percent, compared with Samsung’s 9.3 percent, a 60.5-point gap. By the 60-plus cohort, Apple Flagship is 38 percent compared with Samsung Flagship at 23.2 percent, a 14.8-point gap. The Apple Flagship lead in the youngest cohort is more than four times that in the oldest cohort. The premium tier is closely contested at 45-plus in a way the youth-cohort dominance does not predict.

When Samsung’s combined installed base is plotted against Apple’s, Samsung Total runs 4.5 points above Apple in the 45-to-60 cohort and 1.5 points above in the 60-plus cohort. That convergence reflects portfolio coverage rather than head-to-head premium competition. Samsung addresses every price band in the US smartphone market, from sub-200-dollar Galaxy A devices to the 1,900-dollar Z Fold. Apple addresses only the premium tier, with a value-tier presence at the SE and 16e price points that does not extend below $599. The combined-book comparison sums two different addressable markets. Inside the comparable premium tier, no cohort crossover exists.

Within the same nine-month window, the premium-tier picture varies across cohorts. Apple’s lead over Samsung Flagship in the 18-to-29 cohort widened from 57.6 to 66 percentage points across the window, the most decisive premium-tier movement in the dataset. In the 45-to-60 cohort, the same lead narrowed from 16.7 to 15 percentage points. In the 60-plus cohort, the compression was sharper: from 19.4 to 16 points. The premium tier is sorted by generation. Apple is consolidating among young buyers; Samsung’s flagship is gaining ground among older buyers.

The combined Q3 2025 to Q1 2026 window includes the iPhone 17 launch quarter (Q4 2025), which produced a sharp Apple gain across all cohorts, partially reverting in Q1 2026. The within-window quarterly cuts isolate that effect: Apple’s 18-to-29 share peaked at 76.3 percent in Q4 2025, then settled at 75.2 percent in Q1 2026. The Q1 2026 reading is the most recent post-launch quarter and remains 6.3 points above the Q3 2025 entry.

The 18-to-29 cohort that is moving most decisively toward Apple is also the iPhone segment that cross-shops the most in the dataset. Exclusive Apple loyalty (don’t consider any other brand at all) among 18-to-29 iPhone users is 12.3 percent, the lowest of any age band tracked. Among consumers over 60, exclusive Apple loyalty reaches 35.2 percent, almost three times higher. The young Apple user holds an iPhone today and is also the most open to switching brands for the next purchase.

The combination is unusual. Rising share with low exclusive loyalty indicates Apple is acquiring new young users at scale rather than locking in the ones already there. Position is rising; lock-in is not. Cross-brand consideration data confirms the openness: among 18-to-29 Samsung Flagship users, 30.6 percent considered Apple before their most recent device purchase, the highest cross-Apple consideration rate of any cohort and brand combination in the report. Older cohorts narrow their consideration sets dramatically. Among Apple users over 60, exclusive loyalty at 35.2 percent means more than one in three did not consider any other brand at all. The same shopper behavior that drives high cross-shopping in the young cohort also yields a stable share among older cohorts. Apple is winning the conversion contest in this cohort. Cross-shopping consideration runs both ways, but the realized installed-base share movement of 6.3 points net runs to Apple.

Google’s installed-base share never exceeds 4.3 percent in any age cohort. Motorola peaks at 9.1 percent in the 45-to-60 cohort. Neither brand’s age curve approaches the spread shown by Samsung Flagship or Apple Flagship in the premium tier. The mass-market US smartphone story is an Apple-Samsung story; Google and Motorola compete inside narrower segments.

What this picture suggests for OEM and carrier strategy is asymmetric. Apple’s 18-to-29 share gains arrive without the loyalty buffer that the 45-to-60 and 60-plus shares carry. Samsung Flagship’s natural addressable opportunity is not in the cohort it has lost most ground in, but in the 60-plus cohort, where the premium-tier gap is narrowest and where the brand’s combined book already exceeds Apple’s. Carrier-led upgrade campaigns converting Samsung Non-Flagship users to Galaxy S face different population profiles across target cohorts. The young cohort that Apple is gaining is also the cohort most likely to consider switching.

The Galaxy S26 launched in January 2026, within the most recent quarter in the data window. Q2 2026 will be the first full post-launch quarter to confirm whether Samsung Flagship’s 18-to-29 decline is a structural pattern or a launch-cycle artifact.

Apple’s 38 percent Flagship installed-base share among 60-plus consumers represents the brand’s smallest cohort lead. The structural question is whether today’s 18-to-29 cohort, which has the lowest level of exclusive Apple loyalty in the market, stays with Apple as it ages. The share gains in 18-to-29 are real. So is the openness to change.

This article draws on the demographic findings of Recon Analytics new report, US Consumer Device Purchase Journey Part 4: Demographic Segmentation and the Upgrade Pipeline. The full report covers gender, ethnic community, geographic, consideration, and feature-priority segmentation across all four major US smartphone brands, plus quarterly trend cuts from Q3 2025 to Q1 2026.

If you are interested in the full report, you can find it here:
Digital Products – Recon Analytics

Commerce Secretary Lutnik signaled in an interview with Broadband Breakfast on March 5th, 2025 that the US government will rethink the BEAD program so that Americans “get the benefit of the bargain.” He elaborated that it could mean that homes get broadband through satellite instead of fiber. “We want the lowest cost broadband access to Americans,” he said.

Secretary Lutnik gets it. Connecting a location to broadband for $10k-$30k makes more sense than spending $60k to do the same thing. By approaching the issue from a technology-neutral perspective, we can connect a lot more people for a lot less money while improving connectivity and satisfaction with the connection.

From February 28th, 2024, to February 28th, 2025, Recon Analytics surveyed 160,848 people in the United States and asked them about their broadband experience with their current provider.

To determine satisfaction with their service, we asked consumers a standard net promoter question as developed by Bain, but modified to ask about specific components of the customer experience. Below you see a heatmap of Recon Analytics’ component NPS scores for connectivity. I omitted the customer interaction part of the heatmap for readability.

The 1,113 Starlink subscribers we interviewed over the last year were the most satisfied, followed by consumers of fixed wireless (FWA) with cable, and DSL customers being the least happy. Why are Starlink customers and FWA customers happier than cable and DLS?

While Starlink and FWA can be slower than speeds over cable, most consumers are not engineers or economists who make decisions based solely on technical merit or price. In the case of both Starlink and FWA, our data confirms that customers value the fact that the technology solution is easy to install and easy to get rid of if the consumer is not happy. In Starlink’s case, we have about three times as many former Starlink customers as current Starlink customers. This indicates that there are quite a few people who were unhappy with the solution and swapped out for a different one.

At the same time, the people for whom Starlink or FWA works are very happy with it, especially in comparison to what they had before. Interestingly, we consistently find in our polling data that the higher the cost for a service, the lower consumer satisfaction is, all other things held equal. The low satisfaction scores for cable, even though cable internet service is substantially cheaper than fiber, is a clear indication that cable needs to do a much better job in serving its customers. As confirmed in the quarterly reported financial data, customers leave services with low satisfaction and join services with high satisfaction. In the home internet case, customers choose a more expensive service because, in their experience, the cheaper service is not worth it.

We are also seeing in the data that the Starlink and FWA routers are state-of-the-art equipment. Investment in good routers leads to better scores for how well existing devices stay connected to the Wi-Fi network and how easy it is to connect to Wi-Fi. It also aids in every other connectivity and customer issues metric. This is demonstrated again in the table below.

We are also asking all of our home internet respondents how often they have subjectively experienced internet issues in the last 90 days. The data below is again from the 160,848 people we surveyed over the last year.

What is striking is how well Fiber, FWA, and Starlink are performing when it comes to reliability. When looking at reliability from a customer perspective, it is the interplay between the connection, which is determined by network technology; the router used or supplied; and the end user equipment. The end user equipment is the same for every customer – a mix of smartphones, laptops, desktops, and other connected devices. While Verizon FiOS and AT&T Fiber customers report fewer instances of their internet connection going down, the FWA and Starlink routers are able to mitigate a lot of the more difficult connection technology challenges.

When comparing the data presented in this research note with what was presented six months ago, the Starlink scores for connectivity increased as the company launched more satellites during that period. As Starlink continues to launch more satellites, its scores will change depending on what increases faster – the number of satellites or the number of customers.

Furthermore, it is interesting to see where Starlink customers came from. Eighty-five percent of Starlink respondents are from rural areas, consistent with Starlink’s reporting of where it sells. Almost 31% came from small ISPs. For more than 11% of respondents, Starlink is the first home internet provider that they have, followed by CenturyLink, Charter, Frontier and Comcast, who provide a lot of internet coverage in rural areas.

Recon Analytics data shows that a technology-neutral approach is the right way to go for allocating federal dollars to get affordable broadband out to as many Americans as will take it. There are many Americans, especially in very rural areas, who are very happy with Starlink’s service. Fixed wireless is also solving the broadband rubric for many customers in a satisfactory way. Fixed wireless is especially valuable in less densely populated areas, where ample spectrum and thereby speed and capacity is shared among fewer people resulting in higher speeds. Fiber, without a doubt, is the workhorse technology for more densely populated areas, where satellite and FWA do not have sufficient capacity given the current licensed full-power spectrum constraints to serve customers well.

What we need, and what Secretary Lutnik rightfully alluded to, is a technology-neutral approach where the Americans can choose how they want to be connected at the lowest price considering the circumstances.