Apple gained 6.3 points in installed-base share among 18-to-29-year-old US smartphone users from Q3 2025 to Q1 2026. Exclusive loyalty in the same cohort is 12.3 percent, 23 points below the 60-plus reading.

In the US smartphone installed base, Apple commands the 18-to-29 cohort at 73.7 percent share across the combined Q3 2025 to Q1 2026 window, more than three times Samsung’s combined 19.5 percent. Behind that combined reading, the trend is also moving in Apple’s favor. Apple’s 18-to-29 share rose from 68.9 percent in Q3 2025 to 75.2 percent in Q1 2026, a 6.3-point gain in nine months that is well above the margin of error.

Table 1: Apple 18-to-29 Installed-Base Share by Quarter
Quarter Apple Share Samsung Flagship Share
Q3 2025 68.9% 11.3%
Q4 2025 76.3% 7.9%
Q1 2026 75.2% 9.1%
Combined 73.7% 9.3%
Source: Recon Analytics Consumer Pulse Survey, Q3 2025 through Q1 2026, smartphone-only

The data come from Recon Analytics’ Consumer Pulse Survey, covering 248,279 US smartphone respondents tracked from Q3 2025 through Q1 2026, with respondents’ device brand and model identified via passive detection at survey entry rather than self-report. Apple’s installed base is 93.2 percent in the premium tier and 6.8 percent in the value tier. Samsung’s installed base splits roughly 50-50 between Samsung Flagship and Samsung Non-Flagship.

The age-cohort gap closes sharply by 45-plus and then reverses. Samsung’s combined book reaches 44.7 percent of the 45-to-60 cohort and 44.1 percent of the 60-plus cohort, its highest installed-base concentrations across the four cohorts tracked. Apple’s combined share in those same cohorts falls to 40.2 percent and 42.6 percent. At the brand-total level, Samsung’s installed base exceeds Apple’s at 45-plus, an inversion of the 18-to-29 reading.

Chart 1: US Smartphone Installed-Base Share by Age Cohort

Inside the comparable premium tier, the gap compresses even more sharply than the brand-level numbers indicate. Apple Flagship leads Samsung Flagship across all age cohorts. In the 18-to-29 cohort, Apple’s flagship installed-base share is 69.8 percent, compared with Samsung’s 9.3 percent, a 60.5-point gap. By the 60-plus cohort, Apple Flagship is 38 percent compared with Samsung Flagship at 23.2 percent, a 14.8-point gap. The Apple Flagship lead in the youngest cohort is more than four times that in the oldest cohort. The premium tier is closely contested at 45-plus in a way the youth-cohort dominance does not predict.

When Samsung’s combined installed base is plotted against Apple’s, Samsung Total runs 4.5 points above Apple in the 45-to-60 cohort and 1.5 points above in the 60-plus cohort. That convergence reflects portfolio coverage rather than head-to-head premium competition. Samsung addresses every price band in the US smartphone market, from sub-200-dollar Galaxy A devices to the 1,900-dollar Z Fold. Apple addresses only the premium tier, with a value-tier presence at the SE and 16e price points that does not extend below $599. The combined-book comparison sums two different addressable markets. Inside the comparable premium tier, no cohort crossover exists.

Within the same nine-month window, the premium-tier picture varies across cohorts. Apple’s lead over Samsung Flagship in the 18-to-29 cohort widened from 57.6 to 66 percentage points across the window, the most decisive premium-tier movement in the dataset. In the 45-to-60 cohort, the same lead narrowed from 16.7 to 15 percentage points. In the 60-plus cohort, the compression was sharper: from 19.4 to 16 points. The premium tier is sorted by generation. Apple is consolidating among young buyers; Samsung’s flagship is gaining ground among older buyers.

The combined Q3 2025 to Q1 2026 window includes the iPhone 17 launch quarter (Q4 2025), which produced a sharp Apple gain across all cohorts, partially reverting in Q1 2026. The within-window quarterly cuts isolate that effect: Apple’s 18-to-29 share peaked at 76.3 percent in Q4 2025, then settled at 75.2 percent in Q1 2026. The Q1 2026 reading is the most recent post-launch quarter and remains 6.3 points above the Q3 2025 entry.

The 18-to-29 cohort that is moving most decisively toward Apple is also the iPhone segment that cross-shops the most in the dataset. Exclusive Apple loyalty (don’t consider any other brand at all) among 18-to-29 iPhone users is 12.3 percent, the lowest of any age band tracked. Among consumers over 60, exclusive Apple loyalty reaches 35.2 percent, almost three times higher. The young Apple user holds an iPhone today and is also the most open to switching brands for the next purchase.

Table 2: Apple Exclusive Loyalty by Age Cohort
Age Cohort Apple Exclusive Loyalty
18-29 12.3%
30-44 13.6%
45-60 23.9%
60+ 35.2%
Source: Recon Analytics Consumer Pulse Survey, Jul 2025 through Jan 2026, smartphone-only

The combination is unusual. Rising share with low exclusive loyalty indicates Apple is acquiring new young users at scale rather than locking in the ones already there. Position is rising; lock-in is not. Cross-brand consideration data confirms the openness: among 18-to-29 Samsung Flagship users, 30.6 percent considered Apple before their most recent device purchase, the highest cross-Apple consideration rate of any cohort and brand combination in the report. Older cohorts narrow their consideration sets dramatically. Among Apple users over 60, exclusive loyalty at 35.2 percent means more than one in three did not consider any other brand at all. The same shopper behavior that drives high cross-shopping in the young cohort also yields a stable share among older cohorts. Apple is winning the conversion contest in this cohort. Cross-shopping consideration runs both ways, but the realized installed-base share movement of 6.3 points net runs to Apple.

Google’s installed-base share never exceeds 4.3 percent in any age cohort. Motorola peaks at 9.1 percent in the 45-to-60 cohort. Neither brand’s age curve approaches the spread shown by Samsung Flagship or Apple Flagship in the premium tier. The mass-market US smartphone story is an Apple-Samsung story; Google and Motorola compete inside narrower segments.

What this picture suggests for OEM and carrier strategy is asymmetric. Apple’s 18-to-29 share gains arrive without the loyalty buffer that the 45-to-60 and 60-plus shares carry. Samsung Flagship’s natural addressable opportunity is not in the cohort it has lost most ground in, but in the 60-plus cohort, where the premium-tier gap is narrowest and where the brand’s combined book already exceeds Apple’s. Carrier-led upgrade campaigns converting Samsung Non-Flagship users to Galaxy S face different population profiles across target cohorts. The young cohort that Apple is gaining is also the cohort most likely to consider switching.

The Galaxy S26 launched in January 2026, within the most recent quarter in the data window. Q2 2026 will be the first full post-launch quarter to confirm whether Samsung Flagship’s 18-to-29 decline is a structural pattern or a launch-cycle artifact.

Apple’s 38 percent Flagship installed-base share among 60-plus consumers represents the brand’s smallest cohort lead. The structural question is whether today’s 18-to-29 cohort, which has the lowest level of exclusive Apple loyalty in the market, stays with Apple as it ages. The share gains in 18-to-29 are real. So is the openness to change.



This article draws on the demographic findings of Recon Analytics new report, US Consumer Device Purchase Journey Part 4: Demographic Segmentation and the Upgrade Pipeline. The full report covers gender, ethnic community, geographic, consideration, and feature-priority segmentation across all four major US smartphone brands, plus quarterly trend cuts from Q3 2025 to Q1 2026.

If you are interested in the full report, you can find it here:
Digital Products – Recon Analytics

Verizon’s nationwide wireless outage on January 14, 2026, was the kind of event that doesn’t just disrupt a Tuesday: it hands every competitor field rep a talking point they’ll use for the next 18 months. Recon Analytics surveyed 1,702 business decision-makers between January 21 and February 25, 2026, capturing reactions in the immediate aftermath. The results tell a story that is both better and worse for Verizon than the company probably wants to hear.

The Outage Was Not Felt Equally

The January 14 outage was not a uniform experience across the business market. Impact scaled with company size, and the 23-percentage-point spread between large and small business is the first structural finding.

Large businesses reported the highest direct impact: 44% said the outage affected their company. Midsize companies came in at 33%. Small businesses sat at 21%. The remaining respondents in each segment indicated either no impact or were unsure. The gradient makes operational sense. Large organizations run more lines, more devices, more mission-critical workflows over wireless. A national field service operation or a distributed retail chain has thousands of points of exposure. A five-person shop has a handful. The outage hit large businesses hardest because they have the largest surface area. Large enterprises also operate more redundancy infrastructure, dedicated IT, secondary carrier contracts, Wi-Fi fallback. Whether the 44% figure reflects greater network dependency or greater issue-reporting sensitivity is not separable from this data.

The awareness data runs in the opposite direction. Among small businesses, 12% said they weren’t even aware an outage had occurred, compared to 3% of large enterprises and 7% of midsize. Small businesses run lean. If the phones worked well enough that day, or if the outage was brief enough in their geography, it didn’t register as a business event. Large enterprises have someone whose job is to know when the carrier goes down.

This awareness asymmetry matters for Verizon’s sales team. The enterprise segment felt the outage acutely and paid attention. That’s also the segment where Verizon has historically leaned on network reliability as its core value proposition. The pitch is that you pay more because the network doesn’t go down. January 14 complicated that pitch in the accounts where it matters most.

Figure 1: Was anyone in your company impacted by the Verizon Wireless outage of January 14th, 2026?

Source: Recon Analytics B2B Pulse, January 21st-February 25th, 2026. Percentages based on business respondents. Total n = 1,702, MoE = 2.4%; Large Business (1,000+ employees) n = 561, MoE = 4.1%; Midsize (20-999 employees) n = 538, MoE = 4.2%; Small Business (<20 employees) n = 603, MoE = 4.0%

Opinion Change Was Contained, Not Neutral

Among business customers who were aware of the outage, stated opinion change was limited. Across all size segments, roughly two-thirds said the outage did not change their opinion of Verizon. Opinion stability was statistically consistent regardless of company size.

The more operationally significant data is among those whose opinions did shift. Roughly 5-6% across segments said, “much more negative” and 27-29% said “somewhat more negative.” Combined negative sentiment ran approximately 32-35% across all segments. For an event that hit on a single day lasting about 10 hours, generating negative opinion change in roughly a third of aware business customers is a credibility problem if the narrative isn’t actively managed.

One caveat on the “no change” majority: it captures two distinct customer types that the data cannot separate. The first is the genuinely loyal customer who considers this within the bounds of acceptable carrier performance and has no intention of changing anything. The second is the customer who already held a neutral or negative opinion of Verizon before January 14, who are already at risk of leaving. Both sit in the same response bucket. The data cannot tell you how large each population is.

 Figure 2: (only if impacted by outage) How has the network outage changed your opinion of Verizon Wireless?

Source: Recon Analytics B2B Pulse, January 21st-February 25th, 2026. Percentages based on business respondents who indicated they were impacted by the outage. Total n = 551, MoE = 4.2%; Large Business n = 246, MoE = 6.2%; Midsize n = 179, MoE = 7.3%; Small Business n = 126, MoE = 8.7%

The Loyalty Question Is Where the Size Gap Becomes a Revenue Conversation

Because no pre-outage baseline is available for switching intent in this sample, the figures below represent a post-event snapshot, not a measured change from prior intent levels.

Among current Verizon Wireless business customers asked how the outage affected their likelihood of staying after their current agreement, small businesses were the most forgiving: 65% said the outage had not increased their likelihood of changing providers, 28% said they were more likely to shop around, and 7% were unsure or did not respond. Large businesses showed a different picture, with 39% saying the outage had not increased their likelihood of switching, 59% said they were more likely to evaluate alternatives, and 2% were unsure. Midsize was a statistical tie.

Among large business Verizon customers, 59% said the January 14 outage made them more likely to evaluate alternatives when their contract comes up. Remember, intent to shop is different from switching. Contract lock-in, device payoff schedules, multi-line complexity, and the operational headache of migrating a large business all create meaningful friction between stated intent and revealed behavior. Enterprise switching intent historically overstates eventual switching behavior. Even accounting for that gap, a post-event snapshot where 59% of large business Verizon customers express elevated interest in alternatives is a leading indicator that the competitive pipeline has expanded.

Enterprise wireless agreements typically run one to three years. The cohort of large accounts whose contracts expire in 2026 and 2027 is now at elevated churn risk compared to January 13. Verizon’s enterprise sales team should be in front of those accounts before AT&T and T-Mobile arrive with a pitch deck that opens on January 14.

 Figure 3: (currently using Verizon) How did the outage impact the likelihood of you staying with Verizon Wireless at your next renewal?

Source: Recon Analytics B2B Pulse, January 21st-February 25th, 2026. Percentages based on business respondents who self-reported current Verizon Wireless use. Total n = 510, MoE = 4.3%; Large Business n = 201, MoE = 6.9%; Midsize n = 167, MoE = 7.6%; Small Business n = 142, MoE = 8.2%

The Non-Verizon Market: Enterprise Forgives, Small Business Does Not

Among business customers not currently on Verizon, the outage produced differentiated responses that also track with company size.

Large businesses remained the most open to Verizon despite the outage: 81% said they would still consider Verizon when their current agreement expires. One bad day doesn’t remove a major carrier from consideration. Enterprise procurement decisions involve pricing, coverage, device ecosystems, and account support infrastructure. Small businesses reacted more negatively to the outage, even though they did not experience the outage directly. 24% of small businesses said they would no longer consider Verizon, while 26% said they were unsure. A single outage is a data point, not a disqualifier, but can unbalance customers that are on the fence.

Figure 4: (Not currently using Verizon) How did the outage impact the likelihood of you considering Verizon Wireless next?

Source: Recon Analytics B2B Pulse, January 21st-February 25th, 2026. Percentages based on business respondents who do not use Verizon Wireless (self-reported). Total n = 1,064, MoE = 3.0%; Large Business n = 341, MoE = 5.3%; Midsize n = 334, MoE = 5.4%; Small Business n = 389, MoE = 5.0%

What Verizon Has to Do Now

The January 14 outage created a two-front problem. In the existing base, large business accounts are at elevated renewal risk. In the prospect market, small businesses have partially written Verizon off. But both are addressable.

Verizon’s enterprise team should prioritize proactive outreach to its large account base before those contracts expire. Generic reliability commitments won’t land. The message needs to be specific: what failed, what was fixed, what redundancy was added, what the SLA improvement looks like going forward. Enterprises don’t need apologies. They need engineering answers.

On the prospect side, the small business perception problem is harder because it’s driven partly by information Verizon doesn’t control. The counter-narrative has to reach small business decision-makers through channels they trust: peer networks, trade media, and the resellers and agents who carry Verizon’s products into that segment.

The January 14 outage was one bad day, which must be addressed with customers to protect accounts that could take years to win back if lost.

 

By Joe Salesky, Head of AI Research

Based on interviews with 193,266 Americans conducted between March 2025 and February 2026

A massive and largely quiet transformation is underway in the American workforce. Recon Analytics tracks AI adoption through weekly pulse surveys of over 300,000 respondents annually. The data reveals that 42% of employed AI users now direct those tools toward work tasks, generating an estimated $420 billion in annual productivity value. Only half of these workers say their adoption came through any formal company program. The other half found their own way.

The Workforce Picture

33% of employed Americans now use AI for work tasks. Among knowledge workers in financial services, professional services, scientific and technical fields, communications, media, law, healthcare, education, and government, the rate is 37%. Among employed people who already use AI in any capacity, 42% use AI tools in their jobs.

Workers Are Leading, Companies Are Following

Work AI users who answered questions about their adoption pathway (n=20,934 since July 2025), roughly half report either using AI independently or working at a company with no formal AI initiative. 20% say they adopted AI through a deliberate, self-directed choice with no company involvement at all; another 38% report their company has no formal AI initiative or they are unsure whether one exists. The workforce is pulling AI adoption forward while many organizations are still debating governance frameworks.

For those who can identify initiative drivers, executive leadership accounts for 33% and IT departments for 47%. These figures overlap because respondents can select multiple drivers. The gap between the 47% who credit IT and the 50% operating outside any formal program is a governance challenge.

Who Pays for AI

29% of work AI users pay for a premium subscription to their primary tool. Employer or team funding covered 40% of paid subscriptions in August 2025. That figure has climbed to 50% in February 2026. Corporate procurement is catching up, while half of all paid work AI subscriptions still come out of workers’ own pockets.

Workers spending $20-30 per month of their own money on AI tools they believe make them more productive, without being asked and often without their employer’s knowledge, is a revealed preference. These workers have already conducted the cost-benefit analysis that many enterprise procurement processes are still debating.

Retention Is Strengthening, Not Weakening

For work AI users on paid subscriptions, cancellation intent has declined steadily from 26% in August 2025 to 20% in February 2026. The trajectory is consistent: Four in five paid AI subscribers plan to keep paying.

A 20% cancellation rate in a product category barely two years old compares favorably to mature SaaS categories that typically see 25-35% annual churn in their first 18 months. The downward trajectory suggests that workers who survive the first few months of paid use are settling into habitual usage patterns. Paid AI has crossed from experiment to infrastructure.

The Productivity Signal

Among 18,117 work AI users surveyed over the last 90 days, 97% report at least one tangible benefit and 94% report measurable time savings. The top benefit is increased productivity and efficiency at 45%, followed by quick generation of actionable information at 34%, enhanced decision-making at 28%, and automated repetitive tasks at 24%.

Workers who report hours saved (n=16,154) average 6.3 hours per week. Some of AI’s productivity value does not register as “hours saved”, a developer who writes cleaner code the first time, a marketing analyst who produces three campaign variants instead of one, a sales rep who personalizes 50 outreach emails instead of sending one generic blast: none of these show up as recovered hours. They show up as better output. Self-reported time savings captures one dimension of a multi-dimensional productivity gain.

Based on 161.3 million employed Americans (BLS, 2024 annual average), with 33% using AI and 42% of those directing it toward work, approximately 22 million workers are using AI on the job. At the self-reported mean of 6.3 hours per week and BLS total compensation of $48.05 per hour for civilian workers (Employer Costs for Employee Compensation, June 2025), the annualized productivity value is approximately $340 billion. Adjusted for the occupational skew of AI work users toward professional, technical, and financial roles that carry above-average compensation, the estimate reaches approximately $420 billion in annual productivity value.

What This Means

For enterprise IT leaders, internal AI adoption metrics almost certainly undercount actual usage. Dashboard-tracked deployments of Copilot, Gemini for Workspace, or other enterprise-licensed tools capture only the formal channel. Workers using personal ChatGPT Plus, Claude Pro, or Perplexity subscriptions on their own devices are invisible to those dashboards. The opportunity is to channel demonstrated demand into governed platforms.

For AI platform vendors, employer-funded subscriptions grew from 40% to 50% of paid work AI users in six months. That trajectory points toward corporate procurement absorbing what workers started on their own. The conversion trigger for free users considering paying is integration with existing productivity applications: Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, Salesforce. Prior reports have noted that Enterprise data infrastructure expansion will clearly grow both enterprise paid usage and business impact.

The comprehensive report providing deeper analysis, conclusions, and recommendations is available on ReconAnalytics.com.


Methodology: Recon Analytics AI Pulse Survey. Continuous weekly data collection, March 2025 to present. Total respondents: 193,266 (n=16,154 for hours-saved analysis, last 90 days). Monthly sample sizes range from 944 (March 2025, early panel) to 34,253 (October 2025, full panel). Quality controls reject unqualified responses at 4-10x the industry standard. Productivity value calculation: BLS Employer Costs for Employee Compensation (ECEC), June 2025 release, civilian workers total compensation $48.05/hour; BLS Current Population Survey, 2024 annual average, 161.3 million employed.

Contact: [email protected]

AI Revenue: Paid Adoption Requires Data, Not Better Models

February 17, 2026 | Joe Salesky, Analyst & Head of AI Research


Eight breakthrough model releases in seven months produced four percentage points of daily usage growth. 75% of Americans have tried AI, but only 25% use it daily. The bottleneck is not intelligence. It is trust and context. Privacy scores -30 cNPS across the entire AI ecosystem, the lowest attribute by 28 points, based on more than 120,000 respondents surveyed over 38 weeks. Users who connect AI to their private data convert to paid subscriptions at 3x the rate of those performing basic tasks. The model capability race has hit diminishing returns. The next phase belongs to whoever solves the data infrastructure problem for consumers and enterprise.

The 50-Point Gap Between Trial and Habit

Three out of four Americans have tried an AI tool. One in four uses it daily. The 50-point spread between trial (76%) and habitual use (26%) is not a marketing problem. It is a utility problem.

The middle of the funnel defines the conversion opportunity. 19% of respondents use AI weekly, suggesting it occupies a place in their routine but has not become essential. Another 10% use it monthly. Combined with the 21% who tried AI and walked away, these cohorts represent half the population: consumers who engaged with AI and did not find sufficient value to stay.

The demographic surprise: Millennials, not Gen Z, are the heaviest users. Daily usage peaks in the 30-44 age bracket at 36%, five points ahead of 18-to-29-year-olds at 31%. The explanation is context and compensation. Mid-career knowledge workers face more tasks that align with AI capabilities. The inflection arrives at 60, where daily usage drops to 11%. Seniors have not rejected AI. Nobody has shown them what it can do.

Privacy Is Both the Lock and the Key

45% of Americans remain outside the AI economy. Among those who have never tried AI, 44% cite lack of interest, 25% cite ethical concerns, and 24% cite distrust of AI answers. Cost ranks last in both the never-tried and tried-and-quit segments. Only 5-9% cite expense as a barrier. Free versions exist for every major platform. Price is not the obstacle.

Privacy is the top barrier and the top motivator. 21% of never-tried respondents say knowing their data would be safe and private would motivate them to try AI, the only response exceeding 20%. The same consumers who say they do not trust AI say privacy assurance would bring them in. This is not a contradiction. It indicates that trust is the gate through which new users must pass.

Among active users, the picture is worse. Privacy scores -30 cNPS, nearly 28 points below complete experience (-2). Every platform in the dataset reports negative privacy cNPS, from Perplexity at -18 to Meta AI at -43. Zero for twelve. Apple Intelligence scores -25, underperforming its privacy-centric brand positioning. Payment helps: paid users report -9 versus -34 for free users, a 25-point lift. But no platform achieves positive territory.

ChatGPT Dominates. Satisfaction Tells a Different Story.

ChatGPT leads primary platform selection at 50%. Google Gemini follows at 20%. Microsoft CoPilot (8%), Apple Intelligence (6%), and Meta AI (6%) form a competitive middle tier. The top four platforms represent 83% of primary selections.

Scale inversely correlates with satisfaction among free users. Perplexity, at less than 1% share, posts cNPS of +8. ChatGPT, at 48% of free users, registers -1. Google Gemini scores -6. The pattern is monotonic: larger user base, lower satisfaction. Smaller platforms attract self-selected enthusiasts who chose the tool deliberately. Larger platforms accumulate casual users through distribution advantages and brand awareness.

Paid users report higher satisfaction across every platform without exception. The aggregate cNPS gap: +18 for paid versus -7 for free, a 25-point differential. ChatGPT moves from -1 to +25. Payment is not a gamble. It is a reliable upgrade across the board. The challenge is getting users past the trust barrier to that first payment.

The 3x Conversion Divide

The use case hierarchy is steep. Web search leads adoption at 43%, followed by writing assistance at 33% and topical research at 26%. These information retrieval tasks require no private data, no account connections, no infrastructure beyond the prompt itself. Transformation use cases cluster at the bottom: data analysis at 20%, coding at 9%, automation at 9%.

The conversion gap tells the real story. Coding assistance converts at 41% to paid subscriptions. Automation follows at 37%. Data analysis converts at 31%. Information use cases trail: web search at 17%, topical research at 21%. The 2x gap between transformation and information use cases is not about features. Both tiers offer the same use cases. This is about user profile. Users who need transformation already have infrastructure that makes AI valuable.

Crossing work context with subscription status creates four segments with dramatically different satisfaction profiles. Work + Paid users report productivity cNPS of +23. Home + Free users report -20. The 43-point gap defines the challenge for consumer AI. A Home + Paid user (-1) is no more satisfied than a Work + Free user (-1). Work context provides more satisfaction improvement than payment alone. The difference between +23 and -1 is the combination of subscription plus infrastructure, not the subscription by itself.

The Second Inning Is About Data, Not Models

Data-dependent users, the 18% who employ AI for data analysis or automation, report productivity cNPS of +9 versus -13 for non-data users. They show 61% daily usage versus 28%. They convert to paid at 32% versus 9%, a 3x advantage. This minority demonstrates the engagement and monetization patterns every platform seeks. When users connect AI to their private data, they use it more, value it more, and pay for it more.

The entities with access to private data are not primarily AI companies. Apple holds photos, messages, health data, and financial transactions for over a billion users. Google holds Drive documents, Gmail archives, and location history. Microsoft holds OneDrive files and Outlook correspondence. These companies have the Organize and Unify layers that AI platforms lack. The strategic landscape creates natural partnership opportunities: AI platforms have models but need data access; device and cloud providers have data but need AI differentiation.

The shift is from “ask me anything” to “help me with my data.” The former is a party trick that saturates quickly. The latter is a utility that compounds with use. The stronger engine is ready. It needs better tires for traction.


Report Details

Genius Myopia: Why Smarter Models Aren’t Enough

How Trust and Context Unlock the Next Stage of Adoption | March – December 2025

The complete 23-page report includes detailed analysis of:

  • Usage frequency distribution and demographic breakdowns across age and income segments
  • Barrier analysis for the reluctant 45%, including never-tried and tried-and-quit segments
  • Platform-by-platform market share, satisfaction, and subscription dynamics
  • The O/U/T Framework: Organize, Unify, Transform as the value creation model for consumer AI
  • Connectivity as infrastructure proxy: fiber converts at 2x the rate of cable for paid AI
  • Privacy cNPS across all twelve platforms and the payment improvement effect
  • The Second Inning Playbook for AI Platforms, Device OEMs, Cloud Providers, and Investors

📊 View Report Details & Purchase →

For licensing inquiries: [email protected]

 

AI Choice 2026: Why Licenses Don’t Equal Adoption

February 3, 2026 | Joe Salesky, Analyst & Head of AI Research


Despite Microsoft’s enterprise distribution advantages and Office 365 integration, Microsoft Copilot lost 7.3 percentage points of paid subscriber share in seven months while Google Gemini gained 2.9 points, based on more than 150,000 respondents. Distribution advantages do not lock in market position. Employees receiving enterprise AI tools evaluate options and select based on experience. The platform that delivers the most reliable results wins, regardless of vendor seat licenses.

The 39% Market Contraction

Copilot’s decline from 18.8% in July 2025 to 11.5% in January 2026 represents a 39% contraction in market position among U.S. paid AI subscribers. This occurred during a period when Microsoft actively invested in enterprise distribution and deepened Office 365 integration. The platform accesses the same OpenAI models as ChatGPT, so underlying capability is comparable. The divergence in user perception points to product experience and integration execution rather than model quality.

ChatGPT maintained dominant share near 55.2% with modest erosion from 60.7% in July. Gemini climbed from 12.8% to 15.7%, crossing Copilot in late November to claim the number-two position. The two platforms now separated by more than 4 percentage points, with Gemini’s trajectory continuing upward while Copilot stabilized in the 10-12% range.

Exhibit 1: Primary Platform Share Among U.S. Paid AI Subscribers

 

Source: Recon Analytics U.S. AI Survey, July 2025 – January 2026. U.S. paid subscribers only.

The Workplace Conversion Gap

When Copilot is the only AI platform an employer provides, 68% of workers adopt it as their primary tool. This demonstrates meaningful uptake when alternatives are absent. The competitive dynamics shift when employers offer multiple platforms.

Among workers with both Copilot and ChatGPT available, Copilot’s adoption falls to 18% while ChatGPT captures 76%. When all three major platforms are available, only 8% choose Copilot while 70% choose ChatGPT and 18% choose Gemini. The pattern is consistent: as worker choice expands, Copilot adoption collapses.

ChatGPT converts 83.1% of U.S. paid subscribers who have workplace access. Copilot converts 35.8%. Gemini converts 34.0%. The 47-point gap between ChatGPT and Copilot quantifies the adoption challenge. Microsoft’s Office 365 distribution creates exposure. That exposure does not automatically translate to preference when workers evaluate alternatives.

Exhibit 2: Workplace Conversion Rates by Platform

 

Source: Recon Analytics U.S. AI Survey, July 2025 – January 2026. Workers with paid AI subscriptions only.

Quality Perception Drives Share Movement

Gemini’s rise correlates with quality leadership. The platform posts the highest accuracy satisfaction scores among major competitors, 23 points above Copilot and 9 points above ChatGPT. Copilot’s decline correlates with the lowest accuracy perception in the market. Quality drives share movement, not deployment volume.

Copilot’s accuracy NPS remained persistently negative throughout the measurement period. July showed -3.5, September declined to -24.1, and January finished at -19.8. The gap is not closing. Users who tried Copilot and stopped using it cited distrust of answers at 44.2%, exceeding comparable figures for Gemini (42.8%) and ChatGPT (40.6%).

The correlation between accuracy perception and market share movement is direct. Platforms investing in quality gain share. Those relying on ecosystem integration without matching quality lose share.

The Enterprise Market Remains Contestable

Multi-platform enterprise deployment is common. Among U.S. paid subscribers with Copilot available at work, over half also have ChatGPT available. Workers evaluate options and select based on experience rather than defaulting to whatever platform their employer provisions.

The enterprise AI market is not winner-take-all. Every renewal cycle presents an opportunity for challengers to displace incumbents based on demonstrated superiority. Microsoft’s enterprise dominance in productivity software does not foreordain Copilot’s dominance in AI. Google’s Workspace position does not guarantee Gemini’s success. The platforms that execute on accuracy, integration, and use case demonstration will capture enterprise spend in 2026.

ChatGPT’s 83.1% workplace conversion rate and 55.2% market share reflect entrenched product-market fit. Competitors are not displacing ChatGPT. They are competing for second position. Gemini demonstrated that share can shift when product experience improves. Copilot demonstrated that share can decline when it does not.


Report Details

User Illusion: Licenses Don’t Equal Adoption

U.S. Paid AI Subscriber Market Analysis | July 2025 – January 2026

The complete 24-page report includes detailed analysis of:

  • Platform-by-platform strategic implications for Microsoft, Google, and OpenAI
  • Use case performance across web search, research, writing, coding, and data analysis
  • NPS trajectories showing accuracy perception trends over seven months
  • Churn intent and retention dynamics by platform
  • Investment theses for enterprise AI market positioning

📊 View Report Details & Purchase →

For licensing inquiries: [email protected]

 

On January 16, 2026, OpenAI announced plans to test advertisements in ChatGPT’s free tier and the new $8/month “Go” tier in the United States. The move was widely anticipated: advertising funded the scaling of Google Search and Facebook and has been expected as the monetization path for consumer AI services. With OpenAI reportedly losing over $11.5 billion in Q3 2025 and projecting infrastructure spending of $1.4 trillion over the next eight years, the decision reflects economic necessity rather than strategic pivot.

Our analysis of 117,467 U.S. consumers from the Recon Analytics US_AI Survey reveals the consumer dynamics underlying this decision—and the structural challenges that limit OpenAI’s advertising ambitions.

Metric Finding Implication
Free users unwilling to pay 40% Logical ad audience
Ads as switch trigger 31.6% Monitor for churn
NPS impact if ads added -50% likelihood Implementation matters

Source: Recon Analytics US_AI Survey, May-December 2025; n=117,467

The Monetization Logic

ChatGPT commands 48.5% usage share in the U.S., far ahead of Google Gemini at 18.5%. Only 22.3% of ChatGPT users pay for the service, creating a substantial free user base where advertising represents incremental revenue that would otherwise not exist. Among free users, 40% indicate they would never pay for AI services at any price point. For this segment, advertising is the only viable monetization path.

Platform Share Paid Rate Has Ads
ChatGPT 48.5% 22.3% Coming Soon
Google Gemini 18.5% 12.5% No Plans
Microsoft Copilot 8.0% 27.4% No
Claude 4.3% 35.7% No

Source: Recon Analytics US_AI Survey, May-December 2025; n=117,467

Pioneer’s Peril: The Competitive Reality

OpenAI faces what we term “Pioneer’s Peril”: being first to test AI advertising while helping incumbents refine their approach. Google and Meta will defend aggressively. Advertising represents 77% and 97% of their respective revenues, totaling approximately $456 billion in 2025 and controlling roughly 50% of the global digital ad market. Both already deploy AI-powered ad tools. Google’s Performance Max and AI Max deliver 14% average conversion lifts; Meta’s Advantage+ shows 22% ROAS improvements. The six major agency holding companies control approximately 30% of U.S. ad spend with established workflows and proven ROI benchmarks. Switching costs are material—not technical, but institutional.

Digital advertising already represents 82% of total ad spend globally. OpenAI cannot rely on a secular shift from traditional media; that transition is complete. Any meaningful revenue must come from the existing $777 billion digital pool. Capturing even 1% ($7.8 billion) would require displacing entrenched competitors with superior targeting, measurement, and advertiser relationships that do not yet exist.

User Sentiment: A Window of Opportunity

Ads rank last among current user concerns at just 2%, well below privacy (27%) and job displacement (29%). Users have not yet formed strong negative associations with AI advertising. Whether this remains true depends entirely on implementation quality. Nearly one-third of users (31.6%) indicate ads could trigger them to switch platforms, suggesting that intrusive or poorly executed advertising could accelerate competitive dynamics in a market where switching costs are minimal.

Concern % Citing
Job displacement 29%
Privacy 27%
Accuracy of responses 18%
Bias in AI 12%
Ads / sponsored content 2%

Source: Recon Analytics US_AI Survey; n=117,467

OpenAI’s decision to introduce advertising in the free tier follows sound business logic for user monetization. With 40% of free users indicating they will never pay, advertising represents the only viable revenue path for this segment. However, building a material advertising business faces structural headwinds. Google and Meta’s entrenched positions, AI-powered ad tools, and deep agency relationships create formidable barriers. The most likely near-term outcome is that ChatGPT advertising generates incremental revenue from the free tier but struggles to capture meaningful share of advertiser budgets from platforms with proven performance. We expect modest revenue contribution in 2025-2026, with OpenAI’s advertising ambitions likely measured in hundreds of millions rather than billions.

Methodology: Data from Recon Analytics US_AI Consumer Survey. Fielded May 1 – December 5, 2025. Total sample: n=117,467. Margin of error: ±0.3% at 95% confidence.

 

Numbers and facts are important because they define ultimate limits and capabilities, but numbers and facts don’t make decisions: People make decisions. Nowhere is this truer than in the United States satellite broadband market of late 2025. If we look strictly at the operational scoreboard, the game is over. Starlink has achieved a scale that no competitor can mathematically replicate within the relevant investment horizon. While the data based on now a bit over one million respondents from our Recon Analytics Telecom Pulse Service shows that Starlink holding a massive customer satisfaction lead in rural America over terrestrial as well as satellite legacy providers like HughesNet, dwelling on this gap is an exercise in archaeological irrelevance. HughesNet is effectively liquidating its business model, and ViaSat is pivoting away from it. Both are implicitly acknowledging that the laws of physics have rendered them obsolete. Rural telcos stuck with DSL are holding on for dear life in an era that is rapidly coming to an end. The war against legacy GEO is not just over; the battlefield has been cleared. When the last remnants of rural DSL are being swept away by its skyborne replacement is only a matter of a few years.

The real narrative is not about Starlink beating zombies; it is about the politically engineered survival of its future competitors. The industry is bifurcating into two distinct realities: SpaceX’s operational “rout” and the strategic mandates sustaining Amazon Leo and AST SpaceMobile. These companies matter not because they are currently beating Starlink on metrics—they aren’t—but because the U.S. government and the nation’s largest wireless carriers have decided that a Musk monopoly is strategically unacceptable. Consequently, we are witnessing the creation of a managed market where strategic intervention and corporate hedging sustain competitors that market forces alone would eliminate.

The Carrier Insurgency: The “Never Musk” Wager

While T-Mobile grabbed headlines by pairing with an iconic inventor and a proven technology years ahead of the competition, the most consequential satellite-communications decision of recent years happened quietly in AT&T’s and Verizon’s boardrooms in 2024. Their commitments of capital and spectrum to AST SpaceMobile weren’t bets on the best technology available: they were bets on strategic independence. Even in 2024, it was clear that AST was operationally behind, struggling with a single-digit satellite count while Starlink was deploying thousands. The carriers knew that AST’s service would likely launch later and offer less initial capacity than the vertically integrated juggernaut of SpaceX. They looked at the spreadsheets, saw the performance gap, and decided to stomach it.

This was a calculated strategic sacrifice. AT&T’s decision to lock into a binding agreement with AST through 2030 represents a deliberate strategy to preserve network sovereignty rather than a forced reaction to market constraints. Management feared, and correctly so, that utilizing Starlink would ultimately accelerate Elon Musk’s ambition to become a full-fledged service provider, leading to their own disintermediation as network operators. If they partnered with Starlink, they risked becoming mere resellers in a Musk-controlled ecosystem, effectively funding their own future competitor. Consequently, AT&T was willing to endure the short-term pain of AST’s operational delays to nurture a competitor that preserves their control, calculating that the cost of funding a future Starlink monopoly far exceeds the risks of supporting a slower, inferior alternative.

Verizon followed a similar, albeit more hedged, logic. Their $100 million investment in AST was a coldly calculated but necessary option premium. Verizon leadership recognized that T-Mobile’s exclusivity with SpaceX was temporary, but they also recognized that a world with only one satellite provider gives that provider infinite pricing power. By propping up AST, Verizon keeps a non-SpaceX option alive to discipline the market. They are funding AST not because the tech is currently better—the gap between AST’s 5 satellites and Starlink’s 660 D2C satellites is 100-to-1—but because the contract isn’t with Musk. AST has effectively become a compliance cost for the wireless industry, a tax paid by carriers to ensure they never have to bend the knee to SpaceX.

This “Not-Musk” imperative explains why the investment thesis for AST remains robust despite the fact that its primary differentiator—broadband to the phone—has been neutralized. SpaceX’s confirmed Q1 2026 rollout of full data and voice capabilities has effectively evaporated AST’s unique value proposition. Yet, the carriers cannot waver. The 2025 rupture between Donald Trump and Elon Musk only validated the carriers’ 2024 foresight: relying on a single, politically volatile billionaire for critical infrastructure is a fiduciary hazard. AT&T and Verizon are stuck with AST, and they are happy to be stuck, because the alternative is captivity.

Amazon Leo: The “Too Big to Fail” Regulatory Gamble

If the carriers are engineering AST’s survival through capital, the federal government is engineering Amazon Leo’s survival through regulation. Amazon Leo is not a standard growth story; it is a binary derivative trade on regulatory relief. The scale of Amazon’s deployment deficit is staggering. As of late 2025, Amazon has managed to place only 153 satellites into orbit, leaving a gap of 1,465 satellites against the FCC’s deadline requiring 1,618 by July 2026. This gap is mathematically uncloseable through launch cadence alone. Consequently, Amazon requires a waiver that would typically invite withering scrutiny.

However, Amazon has successfully constructed a regulatory shield by securing BEAD awards for 211,194 locations across 33 states. These awards create a government interest in Amazon’s success. State broadband offices, desperate to show competition, accepted Amazon’s paper promises over SpaceX’s operational reality, effectively making Amazon too big to fail without collapsing a critical federal program. If Amazon cannot illuminate these locations, states face clawbacks and the administration faces a failure of its signature infrastructure project.

The most dominant policy force in the market today is the BEAD program. Amazon Leo’s dominance of the BEAD program was achieved by aggressively buying the market with average bids of just $560 per location, effectively undercutting Starlink by a factor of three. This secures a guaranteed revenue floor estimated at $177 million annually, which exists independent of consumer preference. Regulators are expected to grant the accommodation to avoid entrenching a SpaceX monopoly, using the waiver to provide political cover while maintaining the appearance of regulatory neutrality. The Trump administration increasingly favors Jeff Bezos over the volatile Elon Musk in this context, rendering regulatory accommodation probable. Amazon Leo survives not because it executed, but because the government cannot afford to let it die.

The Political Overlay: 2025 as an Accelerant

While the carriers made their anti-monopoly decisions in 2024, the political volatility of 2025 acted as a powerful accelerant, hardening the “Not-Musk” resolve across the ecosystem. The alliance between Donald Trump and Elon Musk collapsed in June 2025 due to disputes over fiscal policy and devolved into name calling. Although a pragmatic reconciliation began in November, the era of automatic regulatory preference for SpaceX is finished. The relationship has stabilized at “neutral,” a significant downgrade from the “favored” status Musk enjoyed early in the year.

This political oscillation drives strategic positioning. The Pentagon, seeking to hedge political risk rather than simply improve capability, directed “Golden Dome” defense planners to diversify away from exclusive reliance on SpaceX in favor of Amazon. This directive to “diversify” is now embedded in procurement logic, creating a permanent, protected market for a “second source” regardless of the headlines. Just as AT&T and Verizon funded AST to avoid commercial captivity, the Department of Defense is funding Amazon and AST to avoid strategic captivity.

The Reality of Market Bifurcation

The satellite internet industry has organized into four distinct competitive segments, and understanding this structure is essential because winners in one segment do not necessarily dominate the others. While Starlink dominates the LEO consumer broadband market with a +42 Net Promoter Score, the government and carriers have effectively decided to subsidize competitors to ensure market health. This creates a floor for Amazon and AST, and a ceiling on Starlink’s monopoly power.

The numbers are definitive: Starlink’s operational dominance provides a shield that regulation cannot easily penetrate. Its satisfaction lead creates a political asset, insulating the company because no administration can politically afford to disconnect rural American voters. However, the strategic landscape proves that performance is not the only metric that matters. Amazon Leo’s 211,194 committed BEAD locations provide a survival path even if the FCC denies a consumer waiver, converting it into a government-subsidized utility. AST SpaceMobile’s binding contracts with AT&T and Verizon ensure it remains a viable entity, serving as the industry’s indispensable “Plan B”.

Ultimately, the satellite industry acts as a mirror for the broader political economy. The “SpaceX Paradox” defines Amazon’s desperate position: to compete with Starlink, Amazon was forced to contract launches from its primary competitor, implicitly admitting that SpaceX’s capacity was necessary for its own survival. Yet, Jeff Bezos has successfully positioned himself as a “responsible” alternative, securing a vital revenue lifeline to sustain Amazon Leo. The market has bifurcated: Starlink wins on physics and performance in the consumer zone, while Amazon and AST win on politics and diversity mandates in the regulatory and carrier zones.

For investors and executives, the lesson is clear: The narrative of “failure” surrounding legacy providers is simply the sound of the past dying; ignore it. The real signal is the deliberate, expensive, and strategic effort by the world’s largest telecom companies to prevent a SpaceX monopoly. AT&T and Verizon knew exactly what they were buying in 2024: an inferior product that offered the superior benefit of independence. They decided to stomach the lag, the risk, and the cost because the alternative was a future where Elon Musk held the keys to their network. The data tells us who has the best product, but the strategy tells us who will be allowed to survive.

If you want to read more about the interplay between the satellite and broadband industry have a look here.
https://www.reconanalytics.com/products/2027-november-satellite-report-vf/

Commerce Secretary Lutnik signaled in an interview with Broadband Breakfast on March 5th, 2025 that the US government will rethink the BEAD program so that Americans “get the benefit of the bargain.” He elaborated that it could mean that homes get broadband through satellite instead of fiber. “We want the lowest cost broadband access to Americans,” he said.

Secretary Lutnik gets it. Connecting a location to broadband for $10k-$30k makes more sense than spending $60k to do the same thing. By approaching the issue from a technology-neutral perspective, we can connect a lot more people for a lot less money while improving connectivity and satisfaction with the connection.

From February 28th, 2024, to February 28th, 2025, Recon Analytics surveyed 160,848 people in the United States and asked them about their broadband experience with their current provider.

To determine satisfaction with their service, we asked consumers a standard net promoter question as developed by Bain, but modified to ask about specific components of the customer experience. Below you see a heatmap of Recon Analytics’ component NPS scores for connectivity. I omitted the customer interaction part of the heatmap for readability.

The 1,113 Starlink subscribers we interviewed over the last year were the most satisfied, followed by consumers of fixed wireless (FWA) with cable, and DSL customers being the least happy. Why are Starlink customers and FWA customers happier than cable and DLS?

While Starlink and FWA can be slower than speeds over cable, most consumers are not engineers or economists who make decisions based solely on technical merit or price. In the case of both Starlink and FWA, our data confirms that customers value the fact that the technology solution is easy to install and easy to get rid of if the consumer is not happy. In Starlink’s case, we have about three times as many former Starlink customers as current Starlink customers. This indicates that there are quite a few people who were unhappy with the solution and swapped out for a different one.

At the same time, the people for whom Starlink or FWA works are very happy with it, especially in comparison to what they had before. Interestingly, we consistently find in our polling data that the higher the cost for a service, the lower consumer satisfaction is, all other things held equal. The low satisfaction scores for cable, even though cable internet service is substantially cheaper than fiber, is a clear indication that cable needs to do a much better job in serving its customers. As confirmed in the quarterly reported financial data, customers leave services with low satisfaction and join services with high satisfaction. In the home internet case, customers choose a more expensive service because, in their experience, the cheaper service is not worth it.

We are also seeing in the data that the Starlink and FWA routers are state-of-the-art equipment. Investment in good routers leads to better scores for how well existing devices stay connected to the Wi-Fi network and how easy it is to connect to Wi-Fi. It also aids in every other connectivity and customer issues metric. This is demonstrated again in the table below.

We are also asking all of our home internet respondents how often they have subjectively experienced internet issues in the last 90 days. The data below is again from the 160,848 people we surveyed over the last year.

What is striking is how well Fiber, FWA, and Starlink are performing when it comes to reliability. When looking at reliability from a customer perspective, it is the interplay between the connection, which is determined by network technology; the router used or supplied; and the end user equipment. The end user equipment is the same for every customer – a mix of smartphones, laptops, desktops, and other connected devices. While Verizon FiOS and AT&T Fiber customers report fewer instances of their internet connection going down, the FWA and Starlink routers are able to mitigate a lot of the more difficult connection technology challenges.

When comparing the data presented in this research note with what was presented six months ago, the Starlink scores for connectivity increased as the company launched more satellites during that period. As Starlink continues to launch more satellites, its scores will change depending on what increases faster – the number of satellites or the number of customers.

Furthermore, it is interesting to see where Starlink customers came from. Eighty-five percent of Starlink respondents are from rural areas, consistent with Starlink’s reporting of where it sells. Almost 31% came from small ISPs. For more than 11% of respondents, Starlink is the first home internet provider that they have, followed by CenturyLink, Charter, Frontier and Comcast, who provide a lot of internet coverage in rural areas.

Recon Analytics data shows that a technology-neutral approach is the right way to go for allocating federal dollars to get affordable broadband out to as many Americans as will take it. There are many Americans, especially in very rural areas, who are very happy with Starlink’s service. Fixed wireless is also solving the broadband rubric for many customers in a satisfactory way. Fixed wireless is especially valuable in less densely populated areas, where ample spectrum and thereby speed and capacity is shared among fewer people resulting in higher speeds. Fiber, without a doubt, is the workhorse technology for more densely populated areas, where satellite and FWA do not have sufficient capacity given the current licensed full-power spectrum constraints to serve customers well.

What we need, and what Secretary Lutnik rightfully alluded to, is a technology-neutral approach where the Americans can choose how they want to be connected at the lowest price considering the circumstances.

Americans love the internet, accessing it from home and on the road. Until 2007, Americans essentially had two choices when it came to home internet: cable internet or DSL. To the cable industries great credit, they were the first to provide high speed internet access to most Americans with DSL, a slow “other choice” if cable was not available or was too expensive. But beginning in 2007, the telecom companies began to build out fiber, first with Verizon FiOS, and then by AT&T launching fiber service in 2013. By launching fiber networks, telecom companies brought competition to cable in the home broadband market and offered Americans more choices for connecting to the Internet.

In the last three years, the competitive landscape has changed again, for the benefit of American consumers of all stripes.  The mobile network operators have launched Fixed Wireless Access (FWA) and, as we saw during Hurricane Helene, satellite provider Starlink proved its prowess in rural, hard to reach geographies.

FWA has become such a popular choice that the cable companies are losing home internet customers to FWA providers, a trend that has thumped the cablecos market cap. Since launch, Verizon, T-Mobile and AT&T added 10.675 million customers to their FWA service.  And almost all of those subscribers came from cable companies.

FWA service is typically slightly less expensive that fiber or cable home internet, but its satisfaction scores across all 16 cNPS categories is higher.

Part of the reason for the superior cNPS scores are a better purchasing and installation experience for consumers, lower price points and the ability to easily return the product if it does not meet the customer’s satisfaction. This leads to the customers who use the service to be happy with it, while the unhappy customers cancel the service, return the router and continue service with their existing provider and continue to be less than happy with them.

The high satisfaction and lower price for FWA and the dissatisfaction with the other choices available has led FWA to become the preferred next home internet provider of choice for Americans.

Based on interviews with 288,490 Americans conducted between July 2023 and December 2024, 44% of Americans would choose an FWA as their next provider if they would have to make a choice other than their existing provider, 25% would choose a fiber provider, 17% a cable provider, and 6% each would choose DSL or a satellite provider (predominantly Starlink.)

The change in customer preferences is also an opportunity. FWA is the first home internet offer that is being advertised on a nationwide basis, both on a standalone and converged basis. More than 70% of FWA customers are using the mobile solution of the same provider. We are also increasingly seeing a remarkable amount of customers who are switching from one FWA provider to another indicating both a preference for FWA as well as a high aversion to the available wired solutions available. It is also a wakeup call for existing providers, especially cable, to improve their service, both on a technical basis with DOCSIS 4.0 and a relational basis in how they interact with their customers. We are full of hope as some cable providers are introducing NPS as a metric they look at and full of dismay as FWA is being described as CPI or Cell Phone Internet. By describing FWA as cell phone internet, these cable providers do themselves a disservice as cell phones have nothing to do with FWA other than the network they use and shows a blindness to the real threat FWA provides to them. As long as cable views FWA as CPI it will continue to lose as it lives in its own world disconnected from the preferences of everyday Americans.

This has interesting implications for the spectrum policy world. Cable, understandably, is trying to prevent new licensed, full power spectrum to be authorized for cellular use. Why would they? That additional spectrum will enable the mobile operators to offer even more FWA options.   While the wireless industry is pushing hard for more full power, commercial spectrum, it is not a done deal.   In 2024, we have seen FWA speeds and the availability to sign up with FWA in urban market decline indicating that the growth of FWA is becoming more of a supply issue than a lack of demand. Hence the need for more full power spectrum to amp up network capacity to support more FWA.

The outgoing 118th Congress failed to provide Americans with a spectrum pipeline and the FCC with general spectrum authority (Congress provided for temporary spectrum authority to reauction the returned AWS-3 licenses.) The chances that the incoming 119th Congress that takes over in 2025 will provide a spectrum pipeline with licensed, full-powered spectrum is much higher. The last Trump White House leaned much more heavily on the Department of Defense and was able to clear the 3.45 GHz spectrum for commercial use in a record one-year time period. The incoming Senate Commerce Committee Chairman, Senator Cruz (R-TX), has also traditionally been less accommodating to Department of Defense preferences and FCC failure to live up to its congressionally mandated requirements.

In a nutshell, FWA has higher satisfaction scores than any other technology and more Americans want FWA as the way they connect to the internet than any other choice. It is up to Congress to decide if Americans get their wish.

Sometimes old album titles say it best. Today, AT&T marks the start of the expansion of AT&T’s fixed wireless home internet service called AT&T Internet Air. After offering it in its DSL footprint for the last few months, it is now becoming the third nationwide mobile network operator (MNO) to launch a 5G (where available) internet offer.

AT&T is starting in Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Harrisburg/Lancaster/Lebanon, PA; Pittsburgh, Chicago, Detroit, Flint-Saginaw-Bay City, MI; Las Vegas, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Phoenix (Prescott), AZ; Portland, OR; Salt Lake City, Seattle-Tacoma, Tampa-St. Petersburg (Sarasota), and Hartford-New-Haven, CT. Notably, Los Angeles is Charter’s largest market and a T-Mobile FWA stronghold, Philadelphia is Comcast’s home market, and Seattle is T-Mobile’s home market. If the carriers are looking for attention, these launch markets are certainly going to attract it. Another very interesting market is Phoenix. Gigapower, a joint venture in which AT&T is involved, is building out fiber in Mesa, AZ. While the two are about 100 miles apart, it will be interesting to see how the two technologies will be adopted in the same market.

With nationwide combined 3.45 GHz and C-Band of 120 MHz on average, and with at least 100 MHz in every market, AT&T can put significant bandwidth behind its FWA offer. The theoretical maximum speed achievable with 100 MHz of spectrum is 2.3 Gbit/s. It is important to keep in mind that what is possible in theory is also possible in reality – and that wireless is a shared resource. Will someone sitting next to a tower be the only person on the cell to get 2.3 Gbit/s? Possibly, but even though quite a few wireless speed testers have reported wireless download speeds of 600 to 800 Mbit/s, it is far from certain on a loaded network. Even half the theoretical speed is still more than respectable. Quieter than its competitors, AT&T has rolled out its mid-band network to more than 175 million pops.

AT&T Mid-Band Spectrum Depth of 3.45 GHz and C-Band